The Social Contract by Rousseau Jean-Jacques Rousseau
BeiJing:Central Compilationamp;Transtation Press,2014,
BOOK1
4SLAVERY
Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men. If an individual, says Grotius, can alienate his liberty and make himself the slave of a master, why could not a whole people do the same and make itself subject to a king? There are in this passage plenty of ambiguous words which would need explaining; but let us confine ourselves to the word alienate. To alienate is to give or to sell. Now a man who becomes the slave of another does not give himself; he sells himself, at the least for his subsistence: but for what does a people sell itself?
A king is so far from furnishing his subjects with their subsistence that he gets his own only from them; and, according to Rabelais, kings do not live on nothing. Do subjects then give their persons on condition that the king takes their goods also? I fail to see what they have left to preserve.
It will be said that the despot assures his subjects civil tranquility. Granted; but what do they gain, if the wars his ambition brings down upon them, his satiable avidity, and the vexations conduct of his ministers press harder on them than their own dissensions would have done?
What do they gain, if the very tranquility they enjoy is one of their miseries? Tranquility is found also in dungeons; but is that enough to make them desirable places to live in? The Greeks imprisoned in the cave of the Cyclops lived there very tranquility, while they were awaiting their turn to be devoured.
To say that a man gives himself gratuitously, is to say what is absurd and inconceivable; such an act is null and illegitimate, from the mere fact that he who does its out of his mind. To say the same of a whole people is to suppose a people of madmen; and madness creates no right.
Even if each man could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children: they are born men and free; their liberty belongs to them, and no one but they has the right to dispose of it. Before they come to years of discretion, the father can, in their name, lay down conditions for their preservation and well-being, but he cannot give them irrevocably and without conditions: such a gift is contrary to the ends of nature, and exceeds the rights of paternity. It would therefore be necessary, in order to legitimize an arbitrary government, that in every generation the people should be in a position to accept or reject it; but, were this so, the government would be no longer arbitrary.
To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible. Such a renunciation is incompatible with mans nature; to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his acts. Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience. Is it not clear that we can be under no obligation to a person from whom we have the right to exact everything? Does not this condition alone, in the absence of equivalence or exchange, in itself involve the nullity of the act?
For what right can my slave have against me, when all that he has belongs to me, and, his right being mine, this right of mine against myself is a phrase devoid of meaning?
Grotius and the rest find in war another origin for the so-called right of slavery. The victor having, as they hold, the right of killing the vanquished, the latter can buy back his life at the price of his liberty; and this convention is the more legitimate because it is to the advantage of both parties.
But it is clear that this supposed right to kill the conquered is by no means deducible from the state of war. Men, from the mere fact that, while they are living in their primitive independence, they have no mutual relations stable enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war, cannot be naturally enemies. War is constituted by a relation between things, and not between persons; and, as the state of war cannot arise out of simple personal relations, but only out of real relations, private war, or war of man with man, can exist neither in the state of nature, where there is no constant property, nor in the social state, where everything is under the authority of the laws.
Individual combats, duels and encounters, are acts which cannot constitute a state; while the private wars, authorized by the Establishments of Louis IX, King of France, and suspended by the Peace of God, are abuses of feudalism, In itself an absurd system if ever there was one, and contrary to the principles of natural right and to all good polity.
War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its defenders. Finally, each State can have for enemies only other States, and not men; for between things disparate in nature there can be no real relation.
Furthermore, this principle is in conformity with the established rules of all times and the constant practice of all civilized peoples. Declarations of war are intimations less to powers than to their subjects. The foreigner ,whether king, individual, or people, who robs, kills or detains the subjects, without declaring war on the prince, is not an enemy, but a brigand. Even in real war, a just prince, while laying hands ,in the enemys country, on all that belongs to the public, respects the lives and goods of individuals: he respects rights on which his own are founded. The object of the war being the destructi
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社会契约论
【法】让·雅克·卢梭
第一卷
第四章 论奴隶制度
既然任何人对他周围的人都没有天然的权威，而且又由于强力自身根本不能产生权利，那么人们之间任何具有合法性的权威都必须建立在约定的基础之上。
格劳秀斯曾说：“既然一个单独的人可以转让自己的自由，使自己成为一个主人的奴隶；那么为什么整个人类就不能转让他们的自由，使自己成为一个国王的臣民呢？”在这句话中，有一些很不明确的字眼需要我们做出解释。这里我们姑且只就其中的一个字眼——“转让”来说明。转让包含奉送和出卖两层含义。如果一个人能使自己成为另外一个人的奴隶，他不是奉送自己，他是出卖自己以求得至少是生存权作为回报。但是如果全人类都出卖自己，他们是为了求得什么作为回报呢？一个国王不但不能供养他的臣民，相反他还要从他的臣民那里获得供养，用拉伯雷的话说，国王如果没有供养也是不能生存的。难道说臣民们是以国王拿走他们的财产为条件，而把他们自己的人身奉送给国王的吗？如果是这样，那么我看不出臣民们还剩下什么东西值得保存了。
有人可能说，一个专制君主可以为他的臣民保证整个国家的安定。这当然很好，但是如果由于专制君主的野心而引起了对其他政权的战争，如果专制君主总是贪得无厌，如果专制君主的官吏们对人民进行残酷的搜刮，如果这一切与人民的冲突相比会给人民带来更多危害的话，那么人民又会从中得到什么利益呢？如果这种国内和平的状况对人民而言本身就是一种灾难的话，人民又怎么会从中得到什么好处呢？生活在牢狱中也是很太平的，难道这就足以证明牢狱中的生活是很令人向往的吗？被囚禁在独眼巨人西克洛甫的洞穴的希腊人也生活得很太平，但是他们只是在等待挨个被吞噬的命运。
一个人毫不追求回报的把自己奉送给他人，这实在是一件荒谬和不可思议的事情。这样的一种行为是不合法的、无效的，因为任何一个拥有健全心智的人都不会这么做。如果说整个国家的人民都这么做，这就等于整个国家的人民都疯了，而疯狂是不构成权力的。
即使每个单独的个人都能够转让他自己，但是他却不能转让他的孩子。因为孩子生下来就是一个人，他们天生是自由的，他们拥有他们自己的自由；除了他们自己，任何人都无权来处置他们的自由权利。当然，孩子们在达到拥有判断力的年龄之前，他们的父亲可以以孩子的名义制定一些原则，来保护孩子的生存和孩子的福利，但是他不能不可挽回地、毫无条件地把孩子们的自由奉送别人，因为这样一种作为礼物的奉送违反了天然的秩序，而且是对父亲权利的滥用。因此，一个专制独裁的政府要成为一个合法的政府，其条件是每一个新一辈的人都能自由地选择承认或者放弃它；但是，如果这样的话，这样的政府就不再是一个独裁的政府了。
放弃自由就是放弃一个人的人性，就是放弃他作为人的权利，同样也是放弃了自己的义务。对于一个放弃了一切的人来说，是根本没有办法“做出补偿”的。事实上，这样一种放弃是与人的天赋性相违背的。因为如果你剥夺了一个人的意志自由，实际上就等于剥夺了这个人的行为的道德性。任何一个条约，如果它规定了缔约一方的绝对权威和另一方的绝对服从，那么这个条约僵尸不和逻辑的和无效的。对于一个有权利规定任何事情的人，他就将不必对任何事情负有责任，这一点难道不是显而易见的吗？这种既没有互惠性，有没有彼此间互相承担义务的约定，岂不是本身就会使这种行为不具有有效性吗？既然我的奴隶所有的一切都是属于我的，那么他的权利实际上也就是“我”权利，那么他凭什么权利来反对我？而且说我拥有一种“反对”我自己的权利，这不是一句毫无意义的废话吗？
格劳秀斯和其他的一些人声称在战争中为奴役奴隶这种所谓的权利找到了另一个理由。他们争辩说，战争的胜利者有权利杀死战争的失败者，这本身就意味着战败者有权利以放弃他的自由为代价来换取他的生命。这种约定被认为是更加合理合法的，因为这对双方都有利。
但是，很显然，战胜者可以杀死被征服者这种所谓的权利，根本不可能是战争状态带来的结果。因为当人类生存于原始的独立状态中的时候，他们之间的互相交往关系还不能稳定到足以构成一种和平状态或者一种战争状态，所以人与人之间不是天生的敌人。造成战争的，是财富上的冲突而不是人与人之间的争吵。战争的状态不可能出自于单纯的人与人之间的关系，而只是源自于实物财产上的关系。那种发生于一个人与另一个人之间的私人战争既不可能在尚没有固定财产权的自然状态中存在，也不肯跟在一切都被置于法律权威之下的社会状态中存在。
单独的个人之间的搏斗、决斗或者冲突根本不能构成一种战争状态。至于被法兰西国王路易九世的法令所允许、但是却被“上帝之和平”所禁止的私人之间的战争，只不过是对封建政府之职权的一种滥用。如果真的曾经存在这种制度的话，它也是一种非理性的制度，而且他还是与自然的争议以及且合理政体像违背的。
那么，战争就绝对不是人与人之间的关系，而是国家间的关系。在战争中，人与人之间不是以个人身份，也不是以公民身份，而是以士兵身份，纯粹以国家保卫者的身份才成为敌人的。总之，一个国家 只能把林割爱一个国家作为它的敌人，而不是把以个人作为它的敌人，因为内在本性根本不同的事物之间不可能有真正的确定联系。
这一原则也符合以前所有时代所确立的准则，符合任何一个文明的政治社会一贯的实践。宣战不只是对那么政府的警告，更主要的是对那么国家臣民的警告。一个外国人（不管他是一个国王、或是一个单独的个人，亦或是一整个民族）如果没有向另外一个国王宣战，就对那个国王的臣民进行抢劫、杀戮或是拘役，那他就不能被称为敌人，而只是强盗。即使是在战争当中，一个正义的君主也会一方面尽可能多地占有敌国领土上的所有财物，另一方面他却非常尊重哪个国家的个人人身及个人财产。他尊重他自己的权利赖以为基础的那些原则。既然战争目的是征服一个敌对的国家，所以一名战士就可以在敌对国家的保卫者手中握有武器的时候杀死他们；但是一旦这些保卫者放下他们手中的武器投降，他们就不再是敌人或者敌对的国家。战争决不允许造成那些为了胜利而必须的破坏之外的任何破坏。这些原则既不是由格劳秀斯发明的，也不是以诗人的权威作为基础，它们是从外物的本性中得出来的，而且是以理性为基础的。
关于征服者的权利，除了所谓最强者的法则之外，它没有其他任何基础。如果说战争并没有赋予征服者大规模屠杀被征服者权利的话，那么它们奴役被征服者的权力也是无法产生的。一个人只有在无法是、使他的敌人变为他的奴隶的时候，才有权利杀死他，所以把敌人变成奴隶的权利根本不能从杀死敌人的权利中产生出来。因此，让被征服者用他们的自由来换取生命（这种生命权战胜者根本无权占有）就是一场不公平的交易。在这场争论中，既要把生死的权力建立在奴役权的基础之上，又要把奴役的权利建立在生死权的基础之上，这样的争论岂不是陷入了恶性循环之中吗？
即使我们假设那种可怕的屠杀的权利是存在的，我还是要说，战争中的奴隶或者那些被征服的人民除了要被迫服从他们的主人之外，他们对主人没有其他任何义务。既然征服者取走了被征服者生命的等价物，那么征服者对被征服者而言就没有任何的恩惠；他们只是不再过问所得地杀害被征服者，而是用剥削的方式摧毁被征服者。因此除了对被征服者的强权之外，战胜者根本不能获得任何更多的权威，征服者和被征服者之间的战争状态继续存在着。他们之间的这种相互关系是战争的结果，而战争权的继续行驶就意味着任何和平条约是不存在的。他们之间的确曾经有过约定，但是这种协定远不能结束战争状态，而只能预示着战争状态的继续。
这样，无论我们如何来看待这个问题，奴役别人的权利看上去都是无效的。它之所以无效，不仅仅因为它是非正义的，还因为它是荒谬的它是无意义的。“奴隶制”和“权利”这两个词是互相矛盾的，它们互相排斥。不管是一个人和另一个人之间，抑或是一个人和全体人民之间，如果说“我和你定立一个条约，是损失完全归你而利益完全归我；只要我高兴的话，我就遵守这个条约，而且我希望的话，你也得遵守这个条约。”这都是荒谬的。
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